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THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE: A LEGAL AND MORAL DEFENSE
Michael Da Silva

*

Introduction
Scholars, politicians, and the general public alike continue to debate the
1
existence of moral rights to health or health care (‘health rights’) and
whether domestic laws should acknowledge such rights. Yet international
human rights law clearly recognizes a right to health. As Stephen P. Marks
notes, “[e]very country in the world has accepted that human rights are
universal and is bound by at least one treaty containing a provision on the
2
right to health.” The scope and nature of this right is contested, but the
existence of the right as a matter of positive international human rights law
3
is not. Given this, one may think that debate about the status of the right to
health care in international human rights law is a non-starter. Once one
recognizes that realizing a right to health requires health care guarantees,
recognition of the international right to health care as part of the recognized
international right to health should easily follow. Where fully realizing a
right to health is likely impossible, one could further think that focusing on
*

Banting Fellow, Faculty of Law/Institute for Health and Social Policy, McGill
University.
Thank you to Mariana Mota Prado and Nadia Lambek for pushing me on a point in a
presentation of my other work in a manner that inspired the early parts of this paper, to my
doctoral committee (Colleen M. Flood, Sophia Moreau, Lorraine E. Weinrib, Norman
Daniels, and Trudo Lemmens), to Hannah Da Silva for discussion of related issues, to the
organizers and audience at the 2017 Michigan Law Young Scholars’ Conference for helpful
feedback on a previous draft of this text, and to the editors of the Michigan Journal of
International Law for helping me get it into its final form. Professor Prado also introduced me
to some relevant research, which I appreciated. I owe special thanks to Yahli Shereshevsky for
his conference and review assistance and to Steven Ratner for his comments at the conference.
1.
The line between health care and other health-related goods is not always clear.
Any definition of health care will likely admit of borderline cases. I operate here on the
assumption that we can identify certain paradigmatic/core cases of health care. In my doctoral
dissertation, I adopt a working definition of “health care” as “curative, diagnostic and
preventative goods and services provided by (preferably licensed) medical, dental, allied
health, and psychological professionals qua professionals.” Michael Da Silva, Realizing the
Right to Health Care in Canada (2018) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of
Toronto) (on file with author). This definition is imperfect (e.g., it relies on professional
practice, which introduces a threat of circularity or too much deference to expertise), but is
functionally useful here.
2.
Stephen P. Marks, The Emergence and Scope of the Human Right to Health, in
ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 3, 20 (José M. Zuniga et al. eds., 2013). While
new states have been recognized since 2013, the general point about ubiquity remains.
3.
See generally Marks, supra note 2.
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specific goods and services, including health care goods and services, is the
4
only way to realistically measure realization of the right to health. From
this point of view, it may seem obvious that the international right to health
includes a right to health care as one of its constituent parts. Yet recognition
of an international right to health care remains contentious. While the nature
of the debate on the existence of an international right to health care differs
from many domestic debates about health rights, a good case against the
existence of an international right to health care can be and has been made
even from a progressive, pro-rights perspective.
In the following, I outline the case against the international right to
health care and explain why recognition of such a right is still necessary.
The argument is explicitly limited to international human rights law and is
primarily descriptive in nature, but I go on to explain the moral reasons to
accept this account. Both the positive law and moral reasoning could be
used in other health rights debates, but I do not attempt to make such claims
here.
The structure of my work is as follows. I first outline three problems
with recognizing an international right to health care. Then, I present a
defense of the right. My defense takes the form of two lines of argument.
First, I argue that the plain text of the documents that create and interpret
the right to health supports the idea of a right to health care. Contrary to
critics’ claims, the relevant provisions often highlight the importance of
particular health care goods and services and create specific obligations for
states to provide them. The provisions explaining these requirements are
tied not only to a concern with improved health outcomes, but also to other
foundational norms of international human rights law, such as dignity and
equality, which require provision of basic health care and fair distribution of
all health care resources. In the alternative, I argue that, even if the
international right to health does not obviously include a right to health care
as a matter of textual interpretation, such a right can be and should be
developed from other international rights that share the right to health care’s
foundational concerns with dignity and equality. As part of this alternative
approach, I further argue that international law more broadly prioritizes
health care and that recognition of an international right to health care is a
good way of rendering international law coherent by emphasizing health
care’s priority in another area of law. Following presentation of these
arguments, I outline the moral value of recognizing an international right to
health care, explain how my arguments resolve three problems with
recognizing such a right, and address a set of lingering objections.

4.
See, e.g., infra pp. 38–39 on impossibility claims. But see Amartya Sen, Elements
of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 348 (2004) for a contrary view on
the feasibility point.
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I. Three Problems Facing an International Right to
Health Care
The existence of a right to health is uncontested as a matter of positive
international human rights law. The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights’ (the “ICESCR”) canonical definition of this
‘international right to health’ guarantees “the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
5
health.” It can be difficult to determine how to parse this phrasing. For
instance, one can argue over whether the “highest attainable standard”
should be set at a population level (viz., duty-bearers must ensure that all
people reach a shared standard all persons should reach) or at an individual
level (viz., duty-bearers must ensure that all people reach the highest
6
standard that it is possible for the individual persons to reach). Yet it is
reasonably clear that any individual-focused view is going to require the
standard to be tailored to individual circumstances rather than giving each
person a right to the highest level of well-being they could possibly have; no
one has a ‘right’ to be Superman and the state is under no duty to create
superpeople as part of a social contract. It is also clear that the right cannot
require all persons to reach the same level of well-being. Factors beyond the
control of any persons will ensure some disparities. Finally, it is clear that, if
the standard is set at a population level, the standard cannot be full health.
Some people are going to be unhealthy. Almost all persons will be
unhealthy by common standards at some point in their lives if they follow
the regular human life cycle.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (the
“CESCR”) authoritative interpretation of the ICESCR, General Comment
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (the “GC 14”)
accordingly clarifies that the right “is not to be understood as a right to be
7
healthy.” It is instead a set of freedoms and entitlements to goods and

5.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. Similar phrasing appears in
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24, ¶ 1, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]; G.A. Res. 48/104, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
against Women, art. 3(f) (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter DEVW]; Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities art. 25, opened for signature Mar. 30, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRPD].
6.
ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 12.
7.
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 14: The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000)
(emphasis in original omitted) [hereinafter GC 14].
I identify the content of the right to health and thus my proposed right to health care by
examining treaties, customary international law, and general principles of law that discuss
health, authoritative interpretations thereof, and documents mentioned in those interpretations.
In so doing, I use non-binding international legal documents as sources of international law
scholarship and guides to the content of the positive law. While one could argue that these are
subsidiary sources and thus recognized sources of law per the terms in the Statute of the
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8

services, namely those that are “necessary for the realization of the highest
9
attainable standard of health.” More precisely, it “must be understood as a
right to the enjoyment of a variety of facilities, goods, services, and
conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable standard of
10
health.” Given resource constraints, it is likely the case that even this
narrower understanding of a right to health cannot be fulfilled by any
candidate duty-bearer. Controversies as to whether it makes sense to discuss
a right to health as a matter of morality thus persist. It is unclear whether a
right to health can fit the model of all rights having correlative duties (the
11
‘claim-right model’). Yet international human rights law does not always
require rights to be fully realizable to be recognized as legal entitlements.
Indeed, it recognizes the problem of resource constraints and thus only
requires immediate realization of a minimum core of social, cultural, and

International Court of Justice art. 38, opened for signature June 26, 1945, 3 U.S.T. 1153, the
following argument should be legally persuasive, even if one simply grants that non-binding
declarations are valid international law documents in the absence of compliance and that
authoritative interpretations of binding documents are evidence of how best to interpret them.
See Da Silva, Realizing the Right to Health Care in Canada, supra note 1 for more detail on
how I limit my sources of analysis.
The argument should, moreover, be normatively persuasive if one gives any value to
these non-binding documents. Insofar as state practice determines how we should understand
international rights, the fact that a majority of states recognize constitutional rights to health
care provides some support for the view that states believe they are bound to fulfill an
international right to health care. See PATRICK MACKLEM, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 63–64 (2015) on the general ‘internal’ normativity of human rights. The differing
structures between constitutional rights across the world and between constitutional rights and
the international right features in authoritative interpretations provides reason to question this
view. But see Lisa Forman et al., Conceptualising Minimum Core Obligations under the Right
to Health: How Should We Define and Implement the ‘Morality of the Depths,’ 20 INT’L J.
HUM. RTS. 531 (2016) for possible convergence. My argument is not fundamentally based on
state practice. But it does suggest that reading the right to health as entailing a right to health
care makes international law better cohere with transnational norms, which could be read as a
state practice argument.
8.
Henceforth, ‘goods’ should be read as encapsulating ‘goods and services’ absent
indications to the contrary.
9.
GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 9.
10.
Id.
11.
For that model, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710
(1917). For the standard status of this model, see, for example, Hugh Upton, Right-Based
Morality and Hohfeld’s Relations, 4 J. ETHICS 237 (2000). For the criticism that health rights
cannot fit the model, which would actually undermine the broader right to health too, see, for
example, Gopal Sreenivasan, A Human Right to Health? Some Inconclusive Scepticism, 86
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 239 (2012).
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economic rights (including the right to health) and progressive realization of
12
the other elements of the rights.
While even the international right to health may not fit the traditional
claim-right model of rights, the international right still exists and has a
structure that allows one to measure its realization. It is a right to goods
necessary for attaining the highest attainable level of health. Realization of
the minimum core of the right should ensure that all people meet some
standard, which may not be the highest one attainable. Progressive
realization should eventually bring all people to the highest standard
13
attainable since that is the required content of the right. We can then
measure how nations provide the necessary goods. But these goods are
instrumental to an outcome. We can thus also study the extent to which
providing these goods meets the ultimate desired outcome, namely ensuring
all persons reach this highest attainable standard of well-being. In each case,
we are interested in maximizing the number of individuals who meet each
standard, suggesting that the population-focused interpretation of the right is
14
ultimately more consonant with the ICESCR’s canonical definition.
Based on the canonical definition and its attendant framework, it may
seem obvious that the international right to health includes a right to health
care as one of its constituent parts. Surely health care goods are necessary
for realization of the highest attainable standard of health! Even GC 14
skips this explanation, assuming that readers will understand that there is a
right to health care as part of the non-justiciable right to health and going on
to explain that the right to health also includes rights to social determinants
15
of health. The existence of the international right to health care is assumed
to be so obvious that only the international right to the social determinants
of health requires explanation.

12.
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 3: The Nature of
States Parties’ Obligations, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter GC 3]; GC
14, supra note 7, ¶¶ 30, 43–45.
13.
See ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 12; GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 9.
14.
This point is further reinforced by the emphasis on social determinants of health
discussed below.
15.
GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 4. Social determinants of health can be understood as causal
contributors to health. Social determinants of health are legion and include safe and healthy
working conditions, a healthy environment, and housing. On this broad definition, health care
qualifies as a social determinant. For present purposes, I understand the social determinant as
the non-health care-related components of the right. As noted below, infra note 25,
international human rights law recognizes the social determinants as being distinct from
health care. So, my distinction here is necessary to explain the relevant legal phenomena.
Barbara Wilson, Social Determinants of Health from a Rights-Based Perspective, in
REALIZING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 60, 62 (Andrew Clapham et al. eds., 2009) provides a
longer list of social determinants and a discussion of their status in international human rights
law. Her text is also an example of scholarly use of the social determinants/health care
distinction I use here.
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Proponents of an international right to health care nonetheless face at
least three difficulties that jointly present a strong case against recognition
of such a right. They must address these difficulties if they are going to
justify and persuasively advocate for the international right to health care.

A. International Human Rights Law Focuses on Social Determinants
First, while the legal documents granting and specifying the content of
the right to health refer to health care goods and services, the majority of the
right’s attendant duties relate to the social determinants of health. After its
canonical definition, the second sub-clause of the ICESCR’s articulation of
the right to health goes on to state that:
The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of
infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial
hygiene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic,
occupational and other diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical
16
service and medical attention in the event of sickness.
Condition (d) is related to health care. Conditions (a) and (c) may require
some health care provision. Yet (a) and (c) also require provision of the
social determinants of health, and (b) is only related to social determinants.
Duties to provide all four apparently only exist insofar as they are
instrumental to fulfilling a greater duty to realize health and, as the second
problem below makes clear, (d) may be least effective in fulfilling this
instrumental role and thus lowest priority in this list.
This list is, moreover, non-exhaustive. Other documents highlight the
importance of the social determinants of health even more explicitly. The
authoritative interpretation of the right to health explicitly states that food
and shelter form part of the non-derogable core obligations states must
17
provide regardless of resource constraints. While it also states that

16.
ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 12, ¶ 2.
17.
GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 43. I am skeptical of the conceptual coherence of core
obligations as articulated in GC 14 for reasons like those in Katharine G. Young, The
Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content, 33 YALE J.
INT’L L. 113 (2008). Authoritative interpretations of positive international human rights law
nonetheless recognize minimum core obligations. GC 14 is one such example. It discusses
“core obligations” from ¶¶ 43–45. For more on minimal core content and a list of other

Fall 2018]

International Right to Health Care

349

realization requires “functioning public health and health-care facilities,
goods and services,” the list of facilities, goods, and services that fall under
18
this banner primarily focuses on social determinants. Only one class of
traditional health care goods is listed:
The precise nature of the facilities, goods and services will vary
depending on numerous factors, including the State party’s
developmental level. They will include, however, the underlying
determinants of health, such as safe and potable drinking water and
adequate sanitation facilities, hospitals, clinics and other healthrelated buildings, trained medical and professional personnel
receiving domestically competitive salaries, and essential drugs, as
defined by the WHO [World Health Organization] Action
19
Programme on Essential Drugs[.]
While there are also passages suggesting that the right entails a right to
maternal and infant care, the passage in GC 14 is conditional: the goal is to
reduce maternal mortality and stillbirth, and this goal “may be understood”
20
as requiring certain forms of health care. It is plausible to think that it may
be so understood only when those forms of health care actually contribute to
such outcomes. Other bodies addressing similar concerns under the right to
health also emphasize the need to realize social determinants of health. For
instance, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women calls on States to provide “timely access” to family planning
21
services, which may not easily fit under the health care umbrella. General
Assembly resolutions and political declarations alike commonly stress the
22
importance of social determinants.
Even international human rights law documents that highlight the
importance of health care often end up collapsing the distinction between
health care and social determinants of health in a way that supports reading
the right to health as fundamentally concerned with the social
23
determinants. For instance, Steven D. Jamar describes the “international
references to the term in authoritative interpretations of international law, see, e.g., Forman et
al., supra note 7.
18.
GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 12.
19.
Id.
20.
Id. at ¶ 14.
21.
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. on the Work of
Its Twentieth and Twenty-First Sessions U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1, at 7 (1999).
22.
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 63/33, Global Health and Foreign Policy (Dec. 6, 2012)
[hereinafter Global Health]; World Health Org. [WHO], Rio Political Declaration on Social
Determinants of Health, in World Conference on the Social Determinants of Health, Meeting
Report, annex A, at 48 (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.who.int/sdhconference/resources/
Conference_Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
23.
For present purposes, the sources of international law include international
agreements, customary international law, general principles of law, and subsidiary sources,
including authoritative interpretations of the first three sources and expert scholarly work and

350

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 39:343

sense” of health care as including “at least public health, sanitation,
occupational and environmental conditions, education and nutrition, as well
24
as medical treatment.” This is an error. International human rights law
recognizes sanitation et al., as social determinants of health and
25
distinguishes them from health care. But Jamar’s error is an easy one to
make. The documents outlining the international right to health do not
prioritize traditional medicinal or even public health goods that most
commonly fit under the label of ‘health care.’ Rather, they recognize a
variety of social determinants of health as key to realizing the right to
health.
Insofar as one is partial to recognizing an international right to health
care, it is natural to adopt a broader definition of health care that includes
these social determinants. International human rights law even collapses the
distinction at times. For instance, both the Declaration of Alma-Ata and the
WHO’s specific examples of what is included in primary health care include
26
social determinants like education and water, blurring the line between
health care and social determinants and supporting Jamar. Yet GC 14, for
one, recognizes the social determinants of health as distinct from health
27
care. The Constitution of the WHO, in turn, explicitly states that
28
governments must provide “adequate health and social measures.” This
conjunction suggests that health measures and social measures are distinct,
and each is recognized as a necessary government means to fulfill an end of
improved health. International human rights law more broadly, then,
distinguishes health care and the social determinants of health. But even text
supporting the right to health care can be read as actually supporting a
broader set of goods, primarily consisting of social determinants.
Passages of international human rights law emphasizing the
interconnectedness of all rights likewise provide a textual case against the
international right to health care. International human rights law states that
29
all human rights are “indivisible.” Many social determinants of health,
reports on same; Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 7, art. 38. While I am
aware of the debates about the sources of international law, untangling the issues in those
debates is orthogonal to the present task (particularly given my focus on positive international
law as it currently exists).
24.
Steven D. Jamar, The International Human Right to Health, 22 S.U. L. REV. 1, 4–5
(1994).
25.
See, e.g., GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 9.
26.
Int’l Conf. on Primary Health Care, Declaration of Alma-Ata, art. VII, U.N. Doc.
CF/HST/1985-034/Anx.04/07 (Sept. 12, 1978) [hereinafter Declaration of Alma-Ata]; Jamar,
supra note 24, at 47; GC 14, supra note 7, ¶¶ 43–44.
27.
GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 4.
28.
Const. of the WHO, pmbl., 14 U.N.T.S. 185 (July 22, 1946).
29.
The first major statement of this indivisibility is the Int’l Conf. on Hum. Rts.,
Proclamation of Teheran, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (May 13, 1968) (see especially ¶ 13).
The indivisibility was further established by more authoritative and binding statements of
international human rights law. It is now even included in arguable boilerplate in the
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including education and water, are also standalone international rights.
Where rights are indivisible as a matter of positive international human
rights law, recognition of a right in one international human rights law
document is evidence of its existence as a component of another right. Such
evidence is lacking in the case of the right to health care. There is no
standalone right to health care outside of the passages articulating the right
to health (and/or passages articulating other related, explicitly recognized
rights).
Arguments for health justice outside of international law similarly
highlight the importance of social determinants of health in a way that could
impact the persuasiveness and value of any right to health care in
international law. Jennifer Prah Ruger, for one, suggests that health
functioning and agency, which require more than just health care provision,
should be the focus of our moral deliberations and that access to health care
31
is valuable only to the extent that it promotes functioning and agency. Per
Ruger, governments accordingly ought to provide “the social conditions in
which all individuals have the capability to be healthy” as a matter of
32
justice. Even if one brackets Ruger’s broader commitments to functioning
and agency and focuses just on being healthy, such conditions are clearly
broader than access to health care, partly for reasons described below.
Health care itself is not a “social condition,” and “living in a nation with a
functioning health care system” is only one of many conditions that create
this capability. Even traditional champions of health care justice, like
Norman Daniels, now emphasize the importance of the social determinants
33
of health for distributive justice more generally. Insofar as secondary
34
sources are authorities in international human rights law, the fact that
moral arguments for health rights focus on social determinants can be taken
35
as evidence against the existence of an international right to health. This

beginning of human rights documents. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 64/292, The Human Right to
Water and Sanitation (Aug. 3, 2010). For good critical analysis of the indivisibility of human
rights, including some history, see, for example, MACKLEM, supra note 7, at 63–64; DANIEL
J. WHELAN, INDIVISIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY (2010); James W. Nickel, Rethinking
Indivisibility: Towards a Theory of Supporting Relations Between Human Rights, 30 Hum.
Rts. Q. 984 (2008).
30.
The right to education is featured in ICESCR, supra note 5, arts. 13–14. For the
documents outlining the international right to water, see, for example, Hum. Rts. Council,
Rep. of the United Nations High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. on the Scope and Content of the
Relevant Hum. Rts. Obligations Related to Equitable Access to Safe Drinking Water and
Sanitation Under Int’l Hum. Rts. Instruments, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/3 (2007).
31.
JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 36, 134 (2009).
32.
Id. at 134.
33.
NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY (2008).
34.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 7, art. 38.
35.
International human rights law-specific arguments prioritizing the social
determinants of health like Jamar, supra note 24, arguably have an even stronger claim to be
sources of international law. I do not repeat my discussion of such sources here, but the fact

352

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 39:343

suggests that any international right to health care will have limited scope at
best.

B. Increased Access to Health Care Does Not (Maximally) Correlate
with the Normative Goals of the Right to Health
Where Ruger (like Daniels) discusses health justice rather than
international human rights law, her claims may be even more persuasive
evidence for the second challenge facing the purported international right to
36
health care. In short, second, the normativity of the international right to
health is tied to the importance of certain benchmarks and indicators of
health across populations, but recognition of health rights and access to
health care do not strongly correlate with improved health outcomes (at
least when compared to many social determinants). This suggests that the
normativity of the international right to health may not justify an
international right to health care.
The textual problem above already highlights the fact that seeming
international rights to health care appear to exist only as they are
instrumental to realization of the right to health. Yet health care does not
appear to be a strong causal factor in achieving good health, at least when
compared with many social determinants of health. The purely instrumental
rights to health care goods will be severely limited if they cannot fulfill their
instrumental aims. Scientific and social scientific data suggests that they are
(at minimum comparatively) weak contributors to good health. Daniel
Callahan outlines this general point well:
It has long been known that it is not high technology, cure-oriented
medicine that best promotes population health. Instead, public
health measures and socioeconomic improvement accounted for
most of the reduction of mortality over the past century. That
knowledge should lead to an obvious conclusion: goals and
priorities oriented to population health should, in general, have the
37
highest place in health care, in research, and in health policy.
This is not statistical data. Moreover, even Callahan thinks that more things
matter than just mortality. He identifies several goals of health care in a
38
form of non-rights-based value pluralism. Yet Callahan’s charge against
the causal role of medicine in good health undermines the potential for any
purported right to medicinal health care.

that international human rights law scholars emphasize the importance of the social
determinants can also play a role in this prong of the case against the international right to
health care.
36.
See RUGER, supra note 31. For Daniels, see supra note 33.
37.
Daniel Callahan, Ends and Means: The Goals of Health Care, in ETHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF HEALTH POLICY 3, 15 (Marion Danis et al. eds., 2002).
38.
See generally id.
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39

Even if, like Callahan, one includes public health as part of health
care, it is clear that many other social determinants are even more important
than health care. Articles in a special issue of Perspectives in Biology and
Medicine, an interdisciplinary health journal, outlined several good
examples. For example, one’s place in the social status appears to
substantially impact health. The “social gradient” is common throughout the
40
world and across populations. It is unclear if and how health care
41
contributes to these and other inequities. Increased “physiological capital,”
the physical capacity to perform certain tasks, similarly has historically had
a greater impact on reducing health inequalities than has increased access to
42
health care. This is primarily because it reduces “socioeconomic
43
disparities in the burden of disease.” According to Robert W. Fogel, this
supports the view that “environmental improvement is more important than
44
access to health care.” Other significant factors affecting one’s health
45
46
include one’s neighborhood and social isolation. Access to medicine
correlates less strongly with improved health. Public health initiatives may
correlate somewhat better, but other social determinants appear even more
important to realizing the highest attainable standard of health.
The obvious response to this second problem is to state that, even if it is
true that other factors better correlate with improved health, it is wrong to
ignore the impact that health care, particularly public health but even
medicine, has on health outcomes. Health care, in other words, is

39.
Per Callahan: “Medicine is the historically prior institution, and its goals in practice
determined for many centuries what health care became available . . . . With the advent of a
public health perspective much later, and then of organized social and political systems
designed to improve health by deploying both medicine and public health, it became possible
to speak of health care as the generic category for all efforts, medical or otherwise, to protect
and foster good health. Nonetheless, even if medicine can now be subsumed under the broader
category of health care, its scientific knowledge and ability to determine . . . the biological
pathways of disease give it a central role in health care. Medicine remains the fundamental
discipline of health care.” Id. at 6.
He notes that the distinctions between medicine and public health do not create
“anything close to air-tight compartments. Like all typologies, this one [distinguishing the two
and their respective goals] is meant to put the world into some kind of order; and the world, as
always, is not nearly so accommodating as are our invented categories.” Id. at 8.
40.
Michael G. Marmot, Understanding Social Inequalities in Health, 46 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. S9, S9 (2003).
41.
Id. at S14–S15.
42.
Robert W. Fogel, Secular Trends in Physiological Capital: Implications for Equity
in Health Care, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S24, S24 (2003).
43.
Id. at S28.
44.
Id. at S32–S33.
45.
Robert J. Sampson, The Neighbourhood Context of Well-Being, 46
PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S53 (2003).
46.
John T. Cacioppo & Louise C. Hawkley, Social Isolation and Health, with an
Emphasis on Underlying Mechanisms, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S39 (2003).
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instrumentally valuable for health in absolute terms, even if it is not
comparatively instrumentally valuable. Charles Kenny provides one of the
best statistical arguments that human rights and development programs have
been instrumental to improving mortality and other health outcomes
throughout the world. He stresses that social determinants of health are
among the most important contributors to these improvements, but he also
47
states that increased access to vaccines played a foundational role.
Callahan’s challenge, in turn, was lodged against the backdrop of traditional
48
biases toward individual health care. He worried that rising health care
costs, in particular in the pharmaceutical domain, were tied to this emphasis
49
on the individual. Yet he too ultimately recognized the continued
importance of health care even as he called for increased emphasis on the
social determinants of health:
A final motivation for a reexamination of the goals of health care
would be to take better account of the increasing knowledge of the
socioeconomic determinants of health. As matters now stand,
medical treatments and cures are sought for many health conditions
that might be greatly reduced by such nonmedical strategies as
improvements in education, employment, and the environment. The
traditional medical goal of treating the sick would remain, but a
great emphasis would fall not only on public health but also on
50
improving those social conditions known to affect health.
Elsewhere, he states that social determinants demand a “role in health
policy, even though they are outside health care systems as customarily
51
understood,” which is consistent with seeing them as distinct means of
trying to achieve the same end.
Other scholars mentioned above have likewise seemed to recognize
some value in health care. Proponents of community-wide interventions to
address neighborhood-related issues recognize that those can complement
individually-focused policies (though some do not go as far as to say that
52
health care provision programs will do so). Much of Fogel’s data focuses
on curative medicine as being equivalent to health care, but certain forms of

47.
CHARLES KENNY, GETTING BETTER: WHY GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT IS
SUCCEEDING—AND HOW WE CAN IMPROVE THE WORLD EVEN MORE (2011).
48.
Callahan, supra note 37, at 15, identifies this bias in the American context in the
context of his argument for greater emphasis on the social determinants of health.
49.
Id. at 16–17.
50.
Id. at 8. Callahan actually links my critique of Jamar and Ruger’s concerns. He
states that, even if one rightly recognizes that socioeconomic conditions “should surely enter
into any broad scheme of health care,” one can more narrowly define health care, focusing
primarily, in the ordinary cases that motivate the bulk of health law and policy, on public
health and medicine. Id. at 4; see also id. at 8, 13.
51.
Id. at 6.
52.
Sampson, supra note 45, at S61–S62.

Fall 2018]

International Right to Health Care

355

neonatal care that he emphasizes as important are plausibly understood as
53
health care. So, even Fogel seems to recognize the import of some kinds of
health care. He also ultimately acknowledges that health care outreach
programs are important (though primarily because they can help out with
environmental factors). Finally, social isolation too has a significant impact
54
on health. There are indications that capitalism itself partly contributes to
55
increased social isolation. Few would warrant reordering the social
structure for this alone, particularly given that the right to health is supposed
to be consistent with all forms of government. But even proponents of
drastic changes, such as the end of capitalism, recognize that preventative
56
medicine and palliative care would be helpful incremental improvements.
Everyone seems to agree that providing some health care can have positive
outcomes. An argument from authority can thus help address this second
concern.
Even leaving these authorities aside, moreover, comparative analysis of
the relative contributions of health care and social determinants of health to
health outcomes does not undermine the claim that a right to health care is
valuable. The easy response to the second challenge, then, is just to grant
weak correlation between health care and health outcomes (at least when
compared to the correlative between the social determinants of health and
health outcomes) and state that some correlation is all that is necessary. The
right to health care here will be as limited as the causal connections between
health and health care, but it will still exist.
There is, however, a version of this argument that is more damning for
proponents of the right to health care. Much of the concern here appears to
be that recognizing a right to health care will lead to poor priorities. This is
an international equivalent of the concerns that domestic constitutional
57
rights are too easily “co-opted.” Much of the data supporting the primacy
58
of the social determinants of health is comparative in nature. If the
forgoing is true, the data does not prove that there cannot or should not be a
right to health care when looked at in isolation. Yet recognition of a right to
health care can lead to outsized spending on expensive health care goods.
Actual recognition of such rights in the domestic sphere often leads to
increased health care for middle class individuals and does not improve the
59
health of the worst-off members of society. Too many people accordingly
53.
E.g., Fogel, supra note 42, at S34.
54.
Cacioppo & Hawkley, supra note 46.
55.
Id. at S50.
56.
Id. at S50–S51.
57.
See the sources in note 59 below.
58.
See, for instance, notes 52–54 and the surrounding text.
59.
For example, this appears to be true in Brazil. Armando De Negri Filho, Brazil: A
Long Journey Towards a Universal Healthcare System, in ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHT
TO HEALTH, supra note 2, at 176; Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, The Right to Health in the
Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities?, 11 HEALTH & HUM. RTS., 33 (2009); Virgilio
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remain below the internationally guaranteed standard of health, while others
access goods needed to reach a higher level. Talking about an international
right to health care, even as a component of a broader right to health, may
thus confuse the public into thinking they have expansive health care
entitlements under international law and that governments must spend a
great deal on more expensive goods. This could lead to less funding for the
social determinants of health that actually correlate well with increased
health.
One should, on this view, thus only talk of a right to health. Any
claimed entitlements to health care goods should be explicitly discussed in
terms of their proven impact on achieving the internationally guaranteed
standard of health. Determining whether they are actually entitlements as
part of the right should include a comparative analysis to see if the right
would be better achieved by other social determinants to avoid misplaced
priorities that do not accord with the normative goal of increased wellbeing. Such comparative analysis will often auger in favor of the social
determinants of health. The health care component of the international right
to health will thus be limited. It will include vaccines, given Kenny’s
60
aforementioned data, but the remaining scope of the right will be limited.
It will also be difficult to identify ex ante, undermining the action-guiding
nature of an international right to health care. If the scope of the right is only
determinable in comparative contextual analyses, there will be little room to
identify the scope of any purported right to health care as a component of
the right to health simply by reading the relevant international documents
outside of particular contexts where particular funding decisions need to be
made. Explicitly setting out the content of the right in legislation will be
impossible since the scope will always be context-dependent. Current
provisions requiring specific goods will lack justification since many of the
health care goods guaranteed under international human rights law do not
61
contribute to improved health more than the social determinants. This
version of the second problem cannot be solved by just pointing to the fact
that some health care goods do improve health, even if no one disagrees
with that claim.

C. The Purported International Right to Health Care Does Not Fit the
Structure of International Human Rights
Finally, very few international rights require states to create full
systems to realize rights, and international human rights law that supports a

Alfonso da Silva & Fernanda Vargas Terrazas, Claiming the Right to Health in Brazilian
Courts: The Exclusion of the Already Excluded?, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 825 (2011). But see
César Rodríguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L.R. 1669 (2011).
60.
Kenny, supra note 47.
61.
See infra pp. 18–21 for examples of these goods.
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right to health care seems to require states to create health care systems.
This presents a mismatch between the purported international right to health
care and the structure of international human rights generally.
International human rights law contains a requirement for a functioning
62
health care system as part of the right to health. Other passages further
express the need for both a functioning health care system and a legal
framework that defends it. The entitlements in GC 14 “include the right to a
system of health protection which provides equality of opportunity for
63
people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health.” While legislation is
just one option among many for most social rights, the CESCR states that
“[i]n fields such as health . . . legislation may also be an indispensable
64
element for many purposes.” Some statutory protection of the health care
65
system seems necessary. A further requirement for a fair system for health
care allocation can be derived from international human rights law’s
commitment to non-discrimination in decision-making. Per international
human rights law, a fair process for identifying the rights to which one
should be entitled must ensure that decisions are made free from
discriminatory intent and do not have discriminatory effect. It must then
ensure that whatever goods it selects are distributed in a method that ensures
equality of opportunity. For example, the ICESCR’s references to the “equal
and inalienable rights of all” and the rights of “everyone” are read as
66
reflecting the foundational values of equality and non-discrimination. This
has implications for the structure of the selection process and its
implementation. Whatever the result of the process in terms of the range of
goods covered, persons must have equal opportunity to receive their fair
share. A functioning health care system is needed to provide them.
Still, other passages require national policies and strategies for realizing
the right. The Declaration of Alma-Ata states that “governments should
formulate national policies, strategies and plans of action to launch and
sustain primary health care as part of a comprehensive national health
67
system.” GC 14 takes this further and states that the obligation to fulfill the
right to health includes a requirement to “give sufficient recognition to the
right to health in the national political and legal systems, preferably by way

62.
Rio Declaration, supra note 22, at 48, ¶ 7.
63.
GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 8.
64.
GC 3, supra note 12, ¶ 3.
65.
See, e.g., Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, General Comment No. 15 (2013) on the
Right of the Child to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ¶ 94, U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/GC/15 (Apr. 17, 2013).
66.
ICESCR, supra note 5, pmbl.; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General
Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 3, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009).
67.
Declaration of Alma-Ata, supra note 26, art. VIII.
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of legislative implementation, and to adopt a national health policy with a
68
detailed plan for realizing the right to health.”
International human rights law, then, appears to require a system for
distributing health care in a fair manner that is (preferably) legislativelyprotected and a national policy for distributing health care. This is
demanding and does not accord with the structure of other international
rights. Other international human rights do not entail duties to establish
systems of distribution or protection or national strategies or policies.
Social, economic, and cultural rights uncontroversially entail obligations of
69
conduct and result. Such obligations require states to respect, protect, and
70
fulfill the rights. Fulfilling the rights will often require creating systems of
rights protection and sometimes even systems of distribution. But the
explicit requirement to create a formal system for distributing goods under
the right to health is not a universal or even common feature of international
human rights. The right to food, for instance, does not entail explicit duties
71
to establish food distribution services. The right to education requires
some education system to be realized, but it is not explicitly placed in the
category of goods requiring legislative protection of a system that provides
it. International human rights law is generally agnostic on how nations
realize rights, partly due to its concern with ensuring that rights can be
72
realized in a nation with any form of government. Other rights also tend
73
not to require full national implementation policies.
The purported right to health care thus seems to fit uneasily with the
structure of international rights. Stating that a broad right to health must
include a narrower right to health care is an insufficient response to these
concerns. If the narrow right actually demands more than other broad rights,
this suggests a lack of fit between the narrow right and the broader rights
that are clearly part of the order it seeks to join.

68.
GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 36.
69.
GC 3, supra note 12, ¶ 1.
70.
This point is widely recognized. See, e.g., Daniel Tarantola, Global Justice and
Human Rights: Health and Human Rights in Practice, 1 GLOBAL JUST. 11, 12 (2007); Scott
Leckie & Anne Gallagher, Introduction, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A
LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE xx (Scott Leckie & Anne Gallagher, eds. 2006).
71.
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 12: The Right to
Adequate Food, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter Food GC].
72.
E.g., GC 3, supra note 12, ¶ 8; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General
Comment No. 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24
(Dec. 3, 1998).
73.
Indeed, international human rights law’s purported consistency with federalism and
general agnosticism about forms of government is directly opposed to federal intervention
requirements. For application of this agnosticism in the ICESCR context, see GC 3, supra
note 12, ¶ 8 and Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 9: The
Domestic Application of the Covenant, ¶ 5, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/24 (1998) [hereinafter GC
9].
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D. Conclusion
The problems facing the international right to health care, then, are
clear. But I believe they are surmountable. In this work, I accordingly
defend the international right to health care on textual and theoretical
grounds. If successful, this defense will address all three of these issues with
existing accounts.

II. The Textual Argument
The first two problems facing the international right to health care have
textual origins. The text of positive international human rights law
highlights the importance of social determinants of health and establishes a
normative goal for the right to health that is best achieved by ensuring the
social determinants of health rather than health care.
Luckily for proponents of the international right to health care, a more
expansive survey of the relevant international human rights law documents
provides a defense against both criticisms. The plain text of the documents
that create and interpret the right to health supports the idea of a right to
health care as one of its components. Contrary to social determinantsfocused critics’ claims, the relevant provisions often highlight the
importance of particular health care goods and create specific obligations
for states to provide those goods that cannot be reduced to purely functional
commitments to goods that maximize health outcomes.
The statements from the ICESCR and the Declaration of Alma-Ata and
interpretations thereof do not exhaust the statements on the scope of the
right to health. Many other passages in international human rights law also
articulate health care entitlements as part of the right to health. The
Declaration of Alma-Ata is itself focused on primary health care. It actually
followed a conference explicitly devoted to that topic. It states that a
main social target of governments, international organizations and
the whole world community in the coming decades should be the
attainment by all peoples of the world by the year 2000 of a level of
health that will permit them to lead a socially and economically
productive life. Primary health care is the key to attaining this
74
target as part of development in the spirit of social justice.
The global community failed to meet this goal, but the Declaration’s
commitment to primary health care in setting that goal should not be
ignored. Primary health care is central throughout international human
75
rights law. Providing “essential” primary health care is one of the first

74.
Declaration of Alma-Ata, supra note 26, art. V.
75.
Fellow right to health care proponent David Beetham suggests that agreement on
primary health care is also part of a consensus among economists and human rights theorists

360

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 39:343
76

minimum core obligations under the ICESCR’s right to health. Primary
health care provision is also listed as a core obligation under the child’s
77
right to health.
Moving beyond primary health care, other documents, including the
earliest modern human rights documents, also emphasize the role of health
care, including medicinal health care, as components of the international
right to health. The earliest modern international human rights law
document, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the “UDHR”),
includes a right to “a standard of living adequate for the health and well78
being of himself and of his family, including . . . medical care.” Provision
79
of essential medicines is, in turn, prioritized in GC 14. A right thereto can
also be gleaned from section 15 of the ICESCR, which grants a right to
80
benefit from scientific advances. Still other statements of positive
international human rights law explicitly list goods or types of goods that
should be covered. GC 14 states that fulfilling the right requires
81
“immunization programmes against the major infectious diseases.” The
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women mentions
“safeguarding of the function of reproduction” as part of its “right to
protection of health” and states that parties “shall ensure to women
appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the
post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as
82
adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.” While nutrition may
be a social determinant of health, health care services are distinguishable
from (or as) social determinants. The Convention on the Rights of the Child
says parties must “take appropriate measures” to provide “necessary
medical assistance and health care . . . with emphasis on the development of
primary health care,” “appropriate pre-natal and post-natal care for

about the minimal content of the right to health care; David Beetham, What Future for Social
and Economic Rights?, 43 POL. STUD. 40 (1995).
76.
GC 3, supra note 12, ¶ 10.
77.
Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, supra note 65, ¶ 73.
78.
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25 (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
79.
GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 17.
80.
See Stephen P. Marks, Access to Essential Medicines as a Component of the Right
to Health, in REALIZING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH, supra note 15, at 87. But see id. at 93 where
he suggests the right is primarily “derivative” from rights to health and life. Marks suggests
elsewhere that international intellectual property law may be at odds with international human
rights law’s commitment to essential medicines in some respects. See also Stephen P. Marks
& Adriana L. Benedict, Access to Medical Products, Vaccines, and Medical Technologies” in
REALIZING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 305. I address parts of this concern below. See infra Part
III of this work for an argument that international trade law, including international
intellectual property and patent law, actually highlights the importance of health care.
81.
GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 36.
82.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
arts. 11–12, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
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83

mothers,” and “preventative health care.” The Convention of the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities states that parties “shall take all appropriate
measures to ensure access . . . [to services] including health-related
84
rehabilitation.” Many international human rights law documents explicitly
create entitlements to health care.
Even documents establishing the importance of the social determinants
of health and outlining the social determinant-related content of the right to
health highlight the importance of certain health care goods. For instance,
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 63/33: Global Health and
Foreign Policy lists universal health coverage as a determinant of health that
must be considered when fulfilling the right to health, implicitly including
85
health care as an important component of the right to health. More
explicitly, the WHO’s World Conference on the Social Determinants of
Health repeatedly mentioned the importance of health care. Health care did
not come up in every session of the conference, but it came up in multiple
86
sessions. The conference was also understood as building on the earlier
health-care-focused conference at Alma-Ata, suggesting a continuity of
interest between primary health care concerns and social determinants of
87
health as aspects of the right to health care. One of the five themes of the
World Conference on the Social Determinants of Health was explicitly
defined in terms of a need for “universal health care coverage that is
accessible, affordable and of good quality” and the official explanation of
the theme stated that health care services “are essential to the enjoyment” of
88
the right to health. The resulting Rio Declaration on the Social
Determinants of Health in World Health accordingly pledged that
signatories’ health care systems would “promote access to high-quality,
promotive, preventative, curative and rehabilitative health services
throughout the life cycle, with a particular focus on comprehensive and
89
integrated primary health care.”
We must take the text of international human rights law at its word
when it says that there are health care goods to which persons and groups
are entitled under international human rights law. There is nothing to
suggest that the health care goods listed in the relevant documents are more
closely connected with health outcomes than are alternatives (vaccines
notwithstanding). Simply limiting the list of goods required by international

83.
CRC, supra note 5, art. 24, ¶¶ 2(b), (d), (f).
84.
CRPD, supra note 5, art. 25.
85.
Global Health, supra note 22.
86.
WHO, World Conference on the Social Determinants of Health: Summary Report
(2012) [hereinafter WHO, Summary]; Rio Declaration, supra note 22.
87.
WHO, World Conference on the Social Determinants of Health, Meeting Report:
All for Equity (2012), at ix; Rio Declaration, supra note 22, at 48, ¶ 3.
88.
Id. at 50; WHO, Summary, supra note 86, at 3.
89.
Rio Declaration, supra note 22, at 50.
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human rights law to those that are proven to be instrumentally valuable for
health will not explain the existing list of entitlements that the law
recognizes, particularly if this instrumental value must be determined in
comparison with social determinants of health as required by the second
problem above. International human rights law promises a lot more than just
90
vaccines. Essential medicines, as articulated by the WHO for the purposes
of international human rights law, include a wide variety of health care
91
goods. Not all of them are goods for which improved access thereto
strongly correlates with improved health, particularly across populations.
The best explanation for the continued recognition of, for instance,
essential medicines as part of the textually supported health care component
of the right to health is, I think, that these goods are highlighted for other
reasons. These reasons may include realization of other international human
rights, including equality rights, and commitments to the values underlying
the international human rights law regime, such as dignity.
Dignity is the lynchpin of international human rights law. The first
sentence of the UDHR begins with “recognition of the inherent dignity” of
all persons, and dignity is again referred to in the fourth paragraph of the
92
UDHR’s preface and in its first article. The importance of dignity is also
recognized in nearly every relevant international human rights law
93
document. Other rights are explained as reflections of a broader
94
commitment to dignity. Curative medicine guarantees may not maximize
health across populations or even maximize the number of persons at a level
of well-being, particularly when contrasted with social determinant
guarantees, but curative medicine is often necessary to restore people to the
level of well-being necessary to live a dignified existence. This helps
explain the essential medicine commitments above.
Equality and non-discrimination serve similar foundational roles in
international human rights law. A variety of equality guarantees appear

90.
Of course, recognition of an international human right to health care could also be
instrumentally valuable to increased access to vaccines if states believe that they are bound by
international human rights law. Yet many countries that recognize the existence of such do not
provide adequate access to vaccines. This is weak evidence that recognition of an international
right may not perfectly fulfill all the normative goals set out in Part IV. But it also stresses the
importance of reminding nations about the need to provide vaccines without undermining the
case that nations owe duties to provide more than just vaccines.
91.
WHO Model List of Essential Medicines, 20th List, WHO, http://www.who.int/
medicines/publications/essentialmedicines/en/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
92.
UDHR, supra note 78, pmbl., art. 1.
93.
See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 38–43 (Daniel Kayros ed., 2015). Barak actually claims that
human dignity is one of international law’s general principles of law. Id. at 37.
94.
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 15: The Right to
Water, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter GC 15].
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95

throughout international human rights law. Non-discrimination guarantees
96
are also common. Health care guarantees may be necessary to ensure that
all people receive the same level of access to health care goods that
international human rights law deems necessary for specific health
outcomes—such as the protection of dignity—or any other internationally
recognized reason. This helps explain why equal access to quality health
care goods is part of the international right to health care, why nondiscrimination in health care provision is explicitly included as part of the
right to health, and why international human rights law requires a
functioning health care system that distributes goods in a procedurally fair,
non-discriminatory manner.
The international right to health care, then, is not solely normatively
concerned with ensuring the highest attainable standard of health where
health is understood as a high level of well-being. The criteria for further
specifying the health care content of the right to health likewise suggests
that the strong version of the second problem above is not one that
international human rights law seeks to solve. The list of goods above is not
offered as an exclusive list of the health care goods to which one should be
entitled under the right to health. The criteria for determining what else can
be added is non-comparative with respect to social determinants. The goods
97
must be effective. They need not be more effective than (other) social
determinants like a health environment, education, food, or water.
The provisions outlining the importance of dignity and other interests
and undermining the comparative reading of the content of the right to
health also serve as links to the other arguments below. The data that
support the textual argument here could also support the ‘coherence
argument’ below and the values mentioned in the passages help explain the
moral reasons that it is appropriate to recognize an international right to
health care. I now turn to explaining the coherence argument in detail.

95.
E.g., ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 3; CEDAW, supra note 82, art. 11; UDHR, supra
note 78, pmbl., art. 1; Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration, ¶¶ 30, 44,
89, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20, annex I (Oct. 17, 1995); Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, supra note 21, at 7; GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 18.
96.
E.g., Const. of the WHO, supra note 28, pmbl.; CRPD, supra note 5, art. 25;
UDHR, supra note 78, art. 2. Equality and non-discrimination are also standalone rights
elsewhere in the legal order. See, e.g., CRC, supra note 5, art. 2; GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 3.
ALLEN BUCHANAN, THE HEART OF HUMAN RIGHTS 28, 30 (2013) states that promoting
equality (in the sense of equal standing) is a primary function of international human rights
law in general.
97.
“[H]ealth facilities, goods and services must also be scientifically and medically
appropriate and of good quality. This requires, inter alia, skilled medical personnel,
scientifically approved and unexpired drugs and hospital equipment, safe and potable water,
and adequate sanitation.” GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 12 (italicization in original).

364

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 39:343

III. The Coherence Argument
Even if the international right to health does not obviously include a
right to health care as a matter of textual interpretation, such a right can be
and should be developed from other international rights that share the right
to health care’s foundational concerns with dignity and equality.
Interpretations of those rights support this argument. Indeed, even if the
commitments to dignity and equality in the preceding section do not provide
the best explanation for why international human rights law requires the
provision of certain health care goods as part of the right to health, the
commitments to dignity and equality explain why international human
rights law should recognize a right to health care either as part of a broader
right to health or as a standalone right. Again, in short, the provision of
certain health care goods is required to ensure people can access the goods
necessary to enjoy a dignified life and, where all nations provide some
health care, recognizing a right to health care is a valuable means to
ensuring equality and non-discrimination in that health care distribution
process. From this perspective, the aforementioned indivisibility of human
rights actually counts in favor of recognition of an international human
98
rights law. Dignity, equality, and non-discrimination rights are best
understood as partially constituted by a right to health care and make the
most sense when they are part of a normative order that recognizes a right to
health care. Thus, even if dignity, equality, and non-discrimination do not
provide a sufficient limiting principle for identifying the scope of the
99
international right to health care, international human rights law’s
commitments to dignity, equality, and non-discrimination suggest that the
right to health does not need to be read in a manner that is solely concerned
with health outcomes but instead reflects commitments to many values that
support an international right to health care.
International law that is not concerned with human rights likewise
suggests that international law in general recognizes the primary importance
of (and, arguably, right to) health care. International trade law, particularly
the component of international trade law devoted to patents (‘international
patent law’), provides the best example. Exceptions to international patent
law suggest that it too recognizes the importance of health care and carves
out rights to benefit from health care achievements that can plausibly be
understood as aspects of a right to health care. At the very least, these
exceptions establish international human rights law’s normative
commitment to the importance of health care, which supports the coherence
argument for an international human right to health care. Where

98.
See supra note 29.
99.
For the problem of identifying a proper limiting principle, see Michael Da Silva, A
Goal-Oriented Understanding of the Right to Health Care and Its Implications for Future
Health Rights Litigation, 39 DALHOUSIE L.J. 377 (2016); Da Silva, Realizing the Right to
Health Care in Canada, supra note 1.
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international trade law recognizes access to health care as creating a
constraint on the freedom to maximize general market principles,
international trade law could also be understood as recognizing health care
as a right that can conflict with general trade rights but must be balanced
with trade rights and general market demands to maximize each.
The case for the international right to health care from international
trade law is likely more surprising and thus requires more elaboration than
the cases from dignity and equality. To begin, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (the “GATT”) recognizes a general exception to its
standard rules, which are designed for trade liberalization, for measures
100
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.” This
provision on its own is consistent with a view that international law
prioritizes health rather than health care. Indeed, the leading judicial
interpretation of the provision is primarily concerned with health outcomes,
and the main issue on appeal was the evidence that the subject matter of the
case—asbestos—impacts health in a way that justifies an import ban (and,
as an extension, whether less restrictive means could produce the same
101
health outcomes). But the provision does establish that even international
trade law acknowledges that certain health commitments should be capable
of constraining international trade law’s own dominant trade liberalization
norms. Further exceptions then appear to create space for state measures
designed to ensure adequate health care. For instance, the same article of the
GATT creates general exceptions for measures “involving restrictions on
exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of
such materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the
domestic price of such materials is held below the world price as part of a
governmental stabilization plan” and “essential to the acquisition or
102
distribution of products in general or local short supply.” Such provisions
could theoretically apply to health care goods, particularly when a state fails
to fulfill the right to health care obligations I defend throughout this piece
due to an inability to manufacture the goods in the first case or resource
constraints in the second.

100.
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 2, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 1A, art.
XX(b) 1867 U.N.T.S. 493.
101.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001). The
criteria for technical regulations are the other primary issue in that dispute. As noted in that
case, for example, id. ¶¶ 113–116, 128, and in a concurring statement at para 152), the health
impact of goods is partially constitutive of them for the purposes of a like product
comparison. While the case goes on to suggest that states can “determine the level of
protection of health that they consider appropriate” for the purposes of the GATT, id. ¶ 168, it
is notable that the health exception remains, and this variance was used to allow greater health
protections that some would have allowed under the GATT.
102.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(i)–(j), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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The part of international trade law focused on patents makes the
importance of health care even clearer. Pharmaceuticals were placed under
the international patent law regime in the Agreement on Trade-Related
103
Aspects of International Property Rights (the “TRIPS”). That agreement
was designed to balance two competing goals of international law. Both
goals are, notably, fundamentally focused on the importance of health care,
suggesting an even greater priority for health care than the balancing
discussed in the previous paragraph would support:
The TRIPS Agreement represents an attempt at the multilateral
level to achieve the difficult task of balancing the interest of
providing incentives for research and development of new drugs
with the interest of making these drugs as widely accessible as
104
possible to patients needing them.
Only the latter goal focuses exclusively on individual access to goods and is
plausibly understood as a reflection of the need for a right to health care.
Yet the fact that the agreement is committed to balancing and includes
exceptions to the TRIPS’s codified international intellectual property norms
emphasizes the fact that international trade law recognizes the importance of
individual access to health care and is normatively consistent with the
existence of an international right to health care. Indeed, the guiding
principles of the TRIPS are consistent with recognition of the importance of
105
public health, which may be part of or contribute to health care. Article 8
of the TRIPS thus states that:
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development,
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of
this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with
the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the
abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to

103.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
104.
ANTONY TAUBMAN ET AL., A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT 179
(2012); Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents: Obligations and Exceptions,
WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 2006), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/
factsheet_pharm02_e.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
105.
Recall the definition of health care in Callahan, supra note 37.
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practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
106
international transfer of technology.
Later interpretations of public health under the TRIPS specifically identify
access to patented medicines as public health concerns and state that the
107
TRIPS should be read in conformity with a commitment to public health.
Yet these principles still require compliance with the TRIPS.
Further health-related exceptions emphasize the importance of health
care in international law by providing a means to avoid the application of
international trade law in order to increase access to health care. The TRIPS
does not provide a blanket exception for any class of inventions, so
pharmaceuticals and medical technologies as classes are subject to patent
law norms that could undermine access to health care absent some other
108
explicit exception. But the TRIPS includes permissive exceptions that
allow nations to not protect all prima facie patentable goods, and these
exceptions were designed with pharmaceuticals in mind (given the fact that
pharmaceuticals were the chief source of controversy at the time the TRIPS
was negotiated) and are most often used in the pharmaceutical context. Most
famously, Article 30 of the TRIPS states that “Members may provide
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation

106.
TRIPS, supra note 103, art. 8.
107.
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 ILM 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha]; TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note
104, at 179–80. Article 4 of Doha states:
“We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for
all.”
The fact that developing countries sought “a declaration recognizing their right to implement
certain pro-competitive measures, notably compulsory licenses and parallel imports, as needed
to enhance access to health care” and only secured Article 4 could undermine the import of
health care under international trade law. CARLOS CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOHA
DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 9 (2002), http://
www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/WHO_EDM_PAR_2002.3.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
2018). But recognizing limitations on the import of health care and the need to balance
interests only undermines the case for a right to health care on a view of rights as “trumps” (to
use language made famous in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977))
seriously that is inconsistent with international human rights law and most contemporary
scholarship on the nature of rights. Notably, however, the precise legal status of the Doha
Declaration is contested. Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph
6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the
Access to Essential Medicines Problem?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 73, 82–83 (2004).
108.
TRIPS, supra note 103; TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 104, at 98 (making this point
in the case of medical technologies).
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of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties,”
while Article 31 grants Members permission to pass laws allowing “for
other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the
right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by
109
the government” subject to specified conditions.
110
Controversy on how to interpret Article 30 continues. But it is clear
that the exceptions cannot unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation of
the patent or unreasonably conflict with the patent owner’s interest in such
111
regular use. It is also clear that one can offer regulatory exceptions for the
purposes of research and for obtaining marketing approval for a generic
112
version of a patented good. This can speed up access to generic
pharmaceuticals. The case on the use of Article 30 that established the test
113
for compliance was explicitly designed to do so. Per that case, even when
Article 30 exceptions are passed with only pharmaceuticals in mind and
only pharmaceutical regulators can make use of them, they can pass World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) scrutiny despite the ban on blanket exceptions
for classes of goods so long as they do not solely apply to
114
pharmaceuticals.
Article 31, in turn, permits multiple exceptions to patent protections.
Most notably, it permits nations to grant ‘compulsory licenses’ that allow
third parties to produce patent products without the permission of the patent
115
holder. Under the compulsory license regime,
the public interest goal of achieving broader access to the patented
invention is considered more important than the private interest of
the right holder in fully exploiting his exclusive rights. What this
means in the context of public health imperatives is that

109.
Id. arts. 30–31.
110.
Matthews, supra note 107, at 88–92.
111.
Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS114/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Canada]; TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note
104, at 108; Fact Sheet, supra note 104. Part of the controversy discussed in Matthews, supra
note 107, at 88–92 concerns the scope of the finding in that case. Some early interpreters read
the exception as not allowing any commercial use of the final product and limiting the use to
sole approval alone, but research purposes appear to also be allowed on the text of the case
and subsequent interpretations listed in this footnote and subsequent practice discussed therein
treat the case as having this effect.
112.
Canada, supra note 111; see also Margaret K. Kyle & Anita M. McGahan,
Investments in Pharmaceuticals Before and After TRIPS, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1157, 1159
(2012).
113.
See generally Canada, supra note 111.
114.
Id. ¶¶ 171–74.
115.
Although the language of TRIPS does not explicitly refer to compulsory licenses,
article 31 of TRIPS has been recognized as referring to these licenses; Fact Sheet, supra note
104.
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compulsory licensing is intended to permit countries to produce
generic drugs that are more affordable than patented proprietary
116
medicines.
Such rules are intended to have public health effects. The Doha Declaration
117
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health makes this clear. The
declaration itself was partly a response to the issue of access to essential
medicines that was brought into the center of public debate by a proposed
suit from the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa
challenging compulsory licensing in that nation and by a contemporaneous
118
dispute between Brazil and the United States of America at the WTO.
Post-Doha, regional trade agreements can produce Article 31 exceptions
119
under some circumstances, creating further possibilities for exceptions
focused on ensuring access to health care.
Finally, under Article 27 of the TRIPS:
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of
which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to
protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious
prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not
made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.
3. Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment
of humans or animals; [and other items beyond the scope of this
120
work.]
The provisions concerning the protection of health could allow for even
broader protections where health care is necessary for public order of
morality. In practice,
[i]n their legislation, Members have generally understood that this
permissible exclusion from patentability applies to methods for the
treatment of humans or animals, not to medical or veterinary
products, including devices, substances and compositions, for use
in any of these methods. Under this approach, while a new and
inventive way of removing a cataract from the eye may be excluded

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Matthews, supra note 107, at 77.
Doha, supra note 107.
Matthews, supra note 107, at 78–81.
TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 104, at 190.
TRIPS, supra note 103, art 27.

370

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 39:343

from patent protection, an instrument invented to perform this new
121
surgical method would not be so excluded.
Yet domestic legislation does not actually say how nations view the
permissibility. Rather, it shows what they are willing to do in their own
states. So, while this state practice is weak evidence of custom, it does not
122
definitively determine the scope of Article 27 exceptions.
These exceptions may not (and likely will not) perfectly promote access
to health care. They are, rather, reflections of international trade law’s
commitment to the importance of health care. The value and potential of
these exceptions as tools for actually increasing access to health care,
especially medicines and particularly in low-income countries, are
123
constantly questioned and remain contested. Shortly after the TRIPS, the
state of the field could be described as follows:
Experts agree that there is space within the text of the agreement
which, if exploited fully but responsibly, can help countries to
safeguard their public good objectives with reference to availability
of essential drugs, e.g. provisions of compulsory licensing, parallel
124
imports, etc.
Yet, even then, some questioned whether they would be so exploited. The
125
empirical record since that time is mixed. But, as the forgoing made clear,

121.
TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 104, at 103.
122.
See also sources cited supra notes 7, 23.
123.
See, for example, the following, which exemplify periodic recitals and discussions
of pros and cons and propose their own reforms: Coenraad Visser, ‘Affordable Medicines’
Exceptions to Patent Rights Under the TRIPS Agreement: Some Pointers for South Africa?,
34 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 377 (2001); SISULE F. MUSUNGU ET AL., UTILIZING TRIPS
FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION THROUGH SOUTH-SOUTH REGIONAL
FRAMEWORKS (2004); Matthews, supra note 107; Richard D. Smith et al., Trade, TRIPS, and
Pharmaceuticals, 373 LANCET 684 (2009); Ebenezer K. Tetteh, Pharmaceutical Innovation,
Fair Following and the Constrained Value of TRIPS Flexibilities, 14 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
202 (2011); Anh L. T. Tran, Patent Law and Public Health Under the TRIPS Agreement
Standards: How Does Vietnam Benefit from the WTO Membership?, 14 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 334 (2011); Pradip Royhan, Market Access Challenges and Opportunities for
Bangladesh Pharmaceutical Products Under TRIPS, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 932
(2013); Marumo Nkomo, The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Pharmaceuticals Transitional Period: Can It Help Build Capacity in African Least Developed
Countries (LDCs)?, 10 INT’L J. AFR. RENAISSANCE STUD. 48 (2015).
124.
Zafar Mirza, WTO/TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals and Health: Impacts and Strategies, 42
DEV. 92, 96 (1999).
125.
Flexibilities are rarely used. CORREA, supra note 107; MUSUNGU ET AL., supra
note 123. Doha, supra note 107, ¶ 6 arguably highlighted that this was the case for nations
that lacked manufacturing capacities in 2001: “We recognize that WTO members with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties
in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the
Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General
Council before the end of 2002.” It is not clear that this problem is solved in 2018, let alone
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the exceptions are meant to ensure increased access to health care.
International legal actors recognize that these norms are relevant to
international human rights law. The connections between different areas of
international law are particularly salient in the context of health care and
trade. The WHO, the World Intellectual Property Organization (the
126
“WIPO”), and the WTO work together to balance patent norms. The
Human Rights Council, High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Human
Rights Council-appointed special rapporteurs on a variety of rights all look
at the TRIPS from a human rights perspective, often focusing on the right to
127
health.
One may argue that even subjecting pharmaceuticals to international
trade law suggests that international law is hostile to the importance of
pharmaceuticals. Regulating pharmaceuticals was one of the most
128
controversial topics at the meetings that led to the TRIPS. Pharmaceutical
companies led the charge for placing pharmaceuticals under patent
129
regulations. Many critics suggest that recognizing that it is appropriate to
place health care goods under international trade law’s patent provisions
130
may undermine access to essential medicines. However, there is reason to
think that patent protections could provide greater access to health care and
131
improved health outcomes in the long-term. And even if this were not the
132
case,
recognizing that pharmaceuticals are and should be part of
international trade law is consistent with acknowledging special priority for
pharmaceuticals within that trade law regime. Indeed, international law
highlights the importance of ensuring access to medicines, creating
exceptions to the general rules on patents that tend to be applied to health
law. Recognizing that health care is part of trade law may create some
barriers to health care that would not exist in a fully unregulated
international marketplace, but international trade law—and the international
patent law that exists therein—exists, and its normativity is consistent with
other provisions in its priority for protecting access to health care. In other
that it was solved in 2002. This deadline was missed, much like the one identified in the
Declaration of Alma-Ata, supra note 26 that I highlighted above.
126.
TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 104, at 195.
127.
Id. at 216–17.
128.
Mirza, supra note 124, at 93.
129.
Id.
130.
Royhan, supra note 123, at 932 (“A consensus has emerged among developing
countries that the patent rights for pharmaceutical products guaranteed by TRIPS are a
substantial barrier to the policy formulation for ensuring affordable access to medicines for
their people”). But see Nkomo, supra note 123, at 63 (noting that these arguments were
adduced well before developing nations were required to recognize pharmaceutical patents
and were thus raised well before any empirical evidence could even support them).
131.
Mirza, supra note 124, at 93–94, raises this possibility, though he was unable to
empirically measure it in 1999.
132.
See, for example, Kyle & McGahan, supra note 112, at 1157, for evidence that it
does not increase innovation sensitive to the needs of developing countries.
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words, if international trade law is going to exist in this domain, global
leaders recognize that its negative impacts on access to health care must be
133
minimized. Exceptions to the general rules on patents follow suit.
One could argue that these exceptions are political concessions rather
than indications of the primary importance of health care in international
trade law, let alone international law simpliciter. But the argument from
coherence takes the law as given and seeks to explain it in a normatively
acceptable way. An argument from historical origins would have a different
form. It is, of course, true that all international laws have political origins.
The recognition of social, cultural, and political rights was itself
contentious. Different covenants for different kinds of rights were
134
themselves a compromise. To the extent that any international covenants
are normative—despite being the products of international politics—the
same is true of the exceptions to international trade law. The current task is
135
to render the product of these political practices normatively explicable.
The international trade component of the coherence argument is,
admittedly, more ambitious than the components focused on international
human rights law and human rights norms. The international trade law
component particularly faces a structural counterargument that other
components do not face, but that counterargument can be overcome. In
short, the counterargument suggests that one cannot build a positive right
out of negative derogations clauses like those in the TRIPS (or the GATT).
While international human rights law produces explicit equality and nondiscrimination rights and freedoms that can plausibly be used to develop a
positive right to health care, the international trade law passages I identify
do not create any rights or even positive obligations. You cannot, a critic
may charge, create a positive out of a negative. The easiest way to avoid this
criticism is to deny the positive/negative rights and duties distinction. Many

133.
I grant that additional conditions on trade outside the WTO framework have led
many nations to require “TRIPS-plus requirements” for continued trade, which undermine
efforts to prioritize drugs. Smith et al., supra note 123, at 687–88; Kevin Outterson, Fair
Followers: Expanding Access to Generic Pharmaceuticals for Low- and Middle-Income
Populations, in THE POWER OF PILLS 164 (Jillian C. Cohen et al. eds., 2006). This does not
change the fact that international law’s main components recognize the importance of health
care and see access to health care as an important interest against which they must weigh the
goal of innovation, which is itself important partly due to its ability to provide new and better
health care.
134.
For good discussions of these historical controversies that emphasize the
controversies’ impact on the right to health, see THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Brigit Toebes et al. eds., 1999); JOHN TOBIN, THE RIGHT TO
HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012).
135.
For a similar method, see MACKLEM, supra note 7.
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136

scholars do so when arguing for positive rights. But, as I note elsewhere,
137
that distinction is valuable elsewhere (particularly in ethics).
Fortunately, a less problematic response is possible and plausible. I am
unclear on why one would think that a positive cannot be built out of a
negative more generally. But this paper relies only on a commitment to the
view that one can recognize both positive rights and negative liberties as
reflective of values. Where the rights and liberties are supposed to exist as
part of a unified whole, expressions of value underlying a liberty can be
used to support a right and vice versa. Moreover, we should want the
normative order underlying the whole to be coherent and should read
provisions of law in a manner consistent with underlying values of other
areas of law. The coherence argument suggests that international human
rights law and international trade law alike acknowledge the primary import
of health care for reasons that are not strictly concerned with increased
health outcomes at the population level. This supports reading the right to
health in a manner with similarly multifaceted aims. Such a reading
supports a right to health care. While the commitment to the primary import
of health care in international trade law is a less explicitly normative
commitment than international human rights law’s commitment to the value
of dignity, I provided textual support that supports at least an implicit
commitment to this view. Not all underlying values of international law will
be identifiable, and they will conflict, but one should attempt to identify as
many as possible and to make them as coherent as possible. Recognition of
an international right to health care is consistent with such an approach.
International trade law too, then, recognizes the importance of health
care. Recognizing its import in our interpretation of the right to health and
creating a right to health care as part of that broader right coheres with this
international trade law norm. As noted above, such recognition also coheres
with other parts of international human rights law, such as its recognition of
dignity, equality, and non-discrimination rights and its statements that all
these rights and the right to health are indivisible. This is the coherence
argument for the international right to health care.

IV. The Moral Value Of Recognition
As demonstrated above, recognition of an international right to health
care is supported by both the text of international human rights law
documents and the underlying normative structure that appears to undergird
international law. Recognition of such a right is thus valuable for making
sense of the content of international law and establishing its coherence.
Where we desire a normatively coherent international legal order, either as a

136.
STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COSTS OF RIGHTS (1999).
137.
Michael Da Silva, Review Essay: Jeff King, Judging Social Rights, 9 VIENNA J.
INT’L CONST. L. 463, 470 n.47 (2015).
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means of establishing its general authority or for its own sake, this alone
provides reason to think that recognition of an international right to health
care is not only necessary as a means of positive international human rights
law, but normatively desirable.
Still, other moral reasons also count in favor of recognizing the right.
The argument in this paper primarily concerns the positive law. A full moral
case for rights to health care outside the realm of international law is beyond
the scope of this piece. Yet there are other moral reasons to recognize such a
right as a matter of international law. It is worth briefly mentioning them
here. Their importance is then further developed in Parts V and VI, in which
I explain how this approach avoids the problems in Part I and some of the
most damning lingering objections to my argument.
First, recognition is morally valuable for expressive purposes. If the
forgoing is correct, then recognition of an international right to health care
is also valuable as a means of explicitly highlighting our commitments to
other important moral values, such as dignity, equality, and nondiscrimination. International recognition of the importance of the means of
realizing these values, in addition to international recognition of the values
as subjects of standalone rights, is a further sign of commitment to their
importance. There is thus good reason to recognize an international right to
health care.
Second, recognizing the international right to health care is desirable
insofar as it presents clear, achievable action items for realizing human
rights. As noted above, it is difficult to outline the scope of the right to
health’s social determinant components, the exact nature of its attendant
duties, and the extent to which given interventions contribute to realization
thereof. Given the wide range of social determinants of health, it seems like
we need to change the very structure of the world to fully realize the right to
health. While some people believe it is easier to change society than to
138
change individuals, the same people recognize that this appears utopian.
Even if it is not impossible, it makes it difficult to determine where to start.
We should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good and mistake the
potential impossibility of fully realizing the right to health with the nonexistence of duties to fulfill it. But we also need to know where to begin and
how to know if we are contributing to improved realization thereof. The
strong comparison requirement in the second problem above combined with
the causation concerns in the previous paragraph would make this very
difficult. The international right to health care, by contrast, specifies
measurable goods that must be provided to fulfill the right. The number of
goods that are absolutely required for dignity concerns is sufficiently small
as to be potentially realizable. Health care thus provides an easy starting
point in a longer path toward improved human rights realization. While we
must be careful not to misplace priorities, the limited scope of the

138.

See, e.g., Marmot, supra note 40, at S21.
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international right to health care’s core avoids the worst parts of this
concern (as I detail below).
Third, recognition is morally valuable insofar as it requires
governments to provide the goods necessary for a minimally dignified
existence. Recognition can be an actual tool for ensuring more people live
dignified lives, which would be a moral good. International human rights
law’s weak normative status in some jurisdictions and its lack of an
enforcement mechanism limits this potential value of recognition. But
providing additional legal tools for bringing people up to the level of wellbeing necessary for dignity can be helpful and could be a means of helping
realize other important moral ends, including the realization of other, less
controversial human rights. Likewise, fourth, an international human right
to health care can be a tool for health care justice insofar as international
legal arguments are seen in some way as persuasive in the jurisdiction in
question.
Fifth, recognition of an international right to health care makes
international human rights law consistent with global transnational norms. A
139
majority of world constitutions now recognize a right to health care. Many
people in nations without constitutional health rights believe they have a
140
right to health care. International recognition of such a right can provide
guidance on how to understand these domestic rights as part of a larger
transnational legal process and makes sense of right to health care claims
outside the nations that explicitly recognize such a right in their
constitutions. As I argue elsewhere, the form of this apparent international
right to health care is actually consistent with the normatively acceptable
claims made by health rights litigants throughout the globe, suggesting that
international recognition is already part and parcel of a global health rights
141
phenomenon.
Finally, recognition avoids some of the conceptual problems facing the
right to health care. For instance, it explains how one can have a right that
does not fit the traditional claim-right model. If the long history of the right
to health is, in part, a history of a workable right to health care that does not

139.
Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Right to Health: What Does It Mean for Our
Nation and World?, 34 IND. L. REV 1457, 1464–65 (2001); Eleanor D. Kinney & Brian
Alexander Clark, Provisions for Health and Health Care in the Constitutions of the Countries
of the World, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 285, 291 (2004); Courtney Jung et al., Economic and
Social Rights in National Constitutions, 62 Am. J. Comp. L. 1034, 1054 (2014).
140.
For example, many Canadians believe they have a right to health care. ROY J
ROMANOW, COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CAN., BUILDING ON VALUES:
THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA 243 (2002). The Canadian statute guaranteeing
public health is accordingly critical to the self-identity of many Canadian citizens. Colleen M.
Flood & Michelle Zimmerman, Judicious Choices: Health Care Resource Decisions and the
Supreme Court, in HEALTH LAW AT THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 25 (Jocelyn Downie
& Elaine Gibson eds., 2007).
141.
Da Silva, Realizing the Right to Health Care in Canada, supra note 1; Da Silva, A
Goal-Oriented Understanding, supra note 99.
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fit the claim-right model, this is some evidence that there can be rights that
142
do not fit that model.
With these reasons in mind, I now turn to discuss how recognition of
the right in the manner described above addresses the specific conceptual
problems facing the international right to health care detailed above.

V. Solving The Problems With A Right To Health Care
The forgoing account helps avoid each of the three problems facing the
international right to health care that I identified in Part I. The first concern
is most easily avoided. In short, the forgoing grants that the majority of
provisions outlining the international right to health focus on social
determinants of health, but simply responds by noting that there is a
consequential minority of provisions that highlight entitlements to specific
health care goods and to the fair distribution of health care goods. One
cannot ignore these provisions in a good faith interpretation of the law and
should try to make sense of their inclusion in international law.
Acknowledging them as health care components of the right to health makes
the most sense. Recognizing an international right to health care is
necessary to acknowledge the many health care-related provisions of
international human rights law.
The forgoing also addresses the second problem facing a right to health
care. If the international right to health care is not understood as solely
concerned with increasing health at the population level, then its
comparatively weak ability to improve such health outcomes will not
unduly limit its scope. If the right is understood as focused on both
improving health at the population level and ensuring that individuals can
live a minimally dignified existence, then the right need not be overly
expansive, running into the motivating animus between the second problem
above. Recognizing a right to health care need not be monolithic on this
construction. It accordingly need not lead to misplaced priorities that ignore
the importance of social determinants of health as contributors to the
important right to health.
One issue with this response to the second problem lingers, but it can be
addressed. The forgoing does suggest that a health care entitlement does not

142.
Granted, other international rights that do not fit this model provide the same
evidence, but it is helpful for health rights advocates to have proof that non-traditional health
rights can work. The preceding is not an exhaustive list of moral arguments for why
recognition of an international right to health care is justified. It is certainly not an exhaustive
list of reasons for why we recognize health care rights generally, why health care has any
special moral status, or even why we should care about it given the relative value of health
care and the social determinants of health. But it is a strong set of arguments for my narrower
claim. The literature on the broader topic is vast. For an interesting recent piece that takes a
different tack on the last point, see Gabriele Badano, Still Special, Despite Everything: A
Liberal Defence of the Value of Healthcare in the Face of the Social Determinants of Health,
42 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 183 (2016).
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need to be comparatively better than social determinants of health in
contributing to health. Insofar as health is necessary for dignity, we might
think that this account cannot avoid the second concern, even if it is
primarily concerned with dignity. After all, if the social determinants are
better contributors to health, they would be better contributors to dignity by
extension. One could counter this by noting that the right to health’s
emphasis on social determinants of health highlights its focus on population
health while dignity addresses the health of individuals. Such a statement is
likely true. Yet, ultimately, a healthy environment is even more likely to
produce healthy individuals. So, one must deny the strict comparison
requirement for rights realization upon which the strongest version of the
second problem rests. Luckily, however, international human rights law
does not generally include this requirement. Indeed, the provisions above
guaranteeing specific health care entitlements would be nonsensical if such
a requirement existed. My account’s denial of the comparison requirement
is thus supported by international human rights law, and I can deny the
existence of the purported requirement in order to properly address the
second problem above.
The approach above also avoids the third concern. While the
international right to health care does require a minimally functioning health
care system, international human rights law is generally agnostic as to the
form that this system would take, allowing the right to coexist with the
fundamental norms of state sovereignty undergirding international law more
broadly. This agnosticism also highlights the way in which the health care
system requirement is only a part of the broader right. The right is otherwise
structurally identical to other economic, cultural, and social rights. Where
the international right to health care is understood as a complex right with
multiple components, it can survive the challenge that one component fails
to accord with the structure of other rights. If all rights are similarly
complex and/or all rights otherwise share the same structure, then the
international right to health care could survive without its systemic
component even if the third challenge hit its mark.
Yet there are also signs that other rights share the purportedly
anomalous systemic duty element of the international human right to health
care and good reason to think that this feature should be a component of
international rights. The right to water is a good example of a right that
shares the right to health care’s structure. The right to water is not only
rooted in dignity, but is also connected with other rights, such as the rights
143
to health and food. Its scope is not only limited to “the provision of
144
adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking water,” something that
arguably requires a water management system for realization. It also
explicitly includes “ensuring that disadvantaged and marginalized farmers,

143.
144.

GC 15, supra note 94, ¶¶ 1, 3, 6.
Id. ¶ 4 (quoting CRC, supra note 5, art. 24, ¶ 2).
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including women farmers, have equitable access to water and water
management systems, including sustainable rain harvesting and irrigation
technology” and “the right to a system of water supply and management that
145
provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the right to water.”
The right clearly requires establishing a functioning water supply and
management system, which is analogous to the right to a functioning health
care system as part of the international right to health’s health care
component. It also recognizes the need for national strategies and policies.
The authoritative interpretation guarantees:
sufficient recognition of this right within the national political and
legal systems, preferably by way of legislative implementation;
adopting a national water strategy and plan of action to realize this
right; ensuring that water is affordable for everyone; and
facilitating improved and sustainable access to water, particularly
146
in rural and deprived urban areas.
This is remarkably similar to the passage preferring legislative
entrenchment of national health care systems and national health care
147
policies and strategies in GC 14. As with the seeming international right
to health care, moreover, the right to water is not solely systematic in nature.
It also includes a minimum floor of individualized content. For instance, the
CESCR’s authoritative interpretation of the right to water states that “[t]he
elements of the right to water must be adequate for human dignity, life and
148
health.” This dignity-based adequacy threshold keeps the right from being
149
monolithic. Procedural safeguards above this minimum are also present.
From this perspective, the right to health care appears to fit a shared
structure of new international human rights that is complex in nature,
recognizing a minimal floor of content, procedural fairness above it, and the
need to create a full system as a means of ensuring realization of the other
components. It is not only the case that the right to health care is not unique
in its structure. It is further the case that the right is in the vanguard of a new
form of rights recognition and that this vanguard does not fundamentally
undermine the established structure of rights insofar as it is consistent with
well-recognized CESCR practice. From this perspective, for instance, the
right to food is an outlier in not requiring a system of distributing food, and
this unique feature can be partially explained by the fact that people can
feed themselves from the land; any right to a system as part of the right to

145.
146.
the right
54.
147.
148.
149.

Id. ¶¶ 7, 10.
Id. ¶ 26; see also id. ¶ 47 (requiring a “national strategy or plan of action”). As with
to health care, such a strategy must have indicators and benchmarks. See id. ¶¶ 53–
GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 36.
GC 15, supra note 94, ¶ 11.
E.g., id. ¶¶ 10, 12–16.
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food is thus a backstop against a failure to protect the natural resources
150
needed to feed one’s self. That right actually does include a requirement
to create a food strategy that speaks to how any system in place will
151
operate, so there is more consistency between the structure of that right
and the structure of the right to health than one might think on first reading
of the relevant law.
But one does not need to subscribe to this more radical view to avoid
the third problem above. All that is needed to address the third problem is to
show that some other rights fit this form, and so a right to health care built
on the health care-related statements articulating the right to health would
not be a complete outlier in international human rights law. Comparison
152
with the right to water, for one, establishes this more modest claim.
It is also worth noting that the right to health arguably runs into the
third problem even if one takes a social determinants-focused approach to
the right to health. The Rio Political Declaration on the Social Determinants
of Health included “effective systems of preventing and treating ill health”
among the social factors that cause health inequities and explicitly
highlighted “a universal, comprehensive, equitable, effective, responsive
153
and accessible health care system” as a requirement for good health. This
passage is not only further evidence in support of the textual argument
above. It also establishes the need for a health care system as part of the
right to health. So even if we do not recognize an international right to
health care as part of the right to health, we need to recognize a right to a
functioning health care system as part of the international right to health. If
the third problem above undermines the right to health care, it should also
undermine the right to health. But we cannot avoid recognizing the right to
health as a matter of international law. From a positive law perspective,
then, we should not recognize the third problem as undermining the case for
a right to health care. Health rights appear to have required systemic
154
components.

150.
Food GC, supra note 71, ¶ 12.
151.
Id. ¶ 25.
152.
Of course, the right to water is not in the ICESCR or other canonical human rights
documents. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 78, ICESCR, supra note 5, and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171. Drawing on an analogy with a contested right to establish a contested right is less than
ideal. But the CESCR clearly now recognizes the right to water and a right to health care, and
the CESCR’s interpretations are authoritative human rights law documents. Moreover, I
present ample other reason to recognize a right to health care above. If one does not accept
CESCR statements as authoritative in the first place, then the third problem with a right to
health care likely does not arise. The best textual evidence for a systemic component of the
international right to health care is in GC 14. As noted above, the respect, protect, and fulfill
doctrine also provides some support, if not full support, for the systemic requirement.
153.
Rio Declaration, supra note 22, at 48, ¶¶ 6–7.
154.
Notably, the provision of sanitation services as part of the right to water is also
considered part of the right to health. See GC 15, supra note 94, ¶ 29. Insofar as this too

380

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 39:343

VI. Objections And Replies
Positive international human rights law is enormous and controversial.
It is likely that every argument in this domain is open to numerous
objections. My argument for the international right to health care above is
no different. In this final section, I address some of the most damning
potential criticisms.

A. One Cannot Properly Identify the Content of an
International Right to Health Care
The first objection one might raise is that articulating the scope of a
right to health care is problematic in its own right and likely impossible.
Elsewhere, I identified four challenges facing any attempt to fill the content
of a right to health care (in ethics or law): (1) “the argument from the nature
of rights” (“there can be no right to health care because no one owes a duty
to fulfill that right”), (2) “the problem of scope” (it is difficult to set a nonarbitrary stopping point between an overly expansive right to all health care
goods and a specific right to one health care good), (3) “the problem of
principles of scope” (“it is difficult to articulate a principle for selecting
which goods ought to be covered”), and (4) “the problem of time and space”
(“the list of goods required to fulfill a right to health will vary over time and
space as new goods are developed,” so it is difficult to specify the content at
155
any given time in any given place). These are genuine problems for a
moral conception of the right to health care. But they are not damning
problems for the international right to health care or the textual and moral
arguments for such a right presented above.
Regardless of whether one thinks that a right to health care can avoid
156
these problems generally—and I argue that it can elsewhere —the
international right to health care deals with them admirably. It states that
governments owe the chief corresponding primary duties of the right to
health care (and specifies some circumstances where non-state actors may
157
owe them). It further specifies that developed nations will have specific
158
duties to assist developing nations fulfill their duties. It articulates which
goods are included in the list, avoiding the expansive end of the problem of
scope, and updates specific lists of what counts as, for instance, ‘essential
medicines,’ thereby avoiding the problem of space and time. The
requirement for procedural safeguards for health care allocations above the

requires a sanitation system, the right to health may have non-health care-based systemic
elements too.
155.
Da Silva, Realizing the Right to Health Care in Canada, supra note 1; Da Silva, A
Goal-Oriented Understanding, supra note 99, at 379–82.
156.
See, e.g., id.
157.
GC 14, supra note 7, ¶¶ 63–65.
158.
Id. ¶ 40.
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minimum floor set out in the WHO’s Model List of Essential Medicines,
for example, avoids the narrow end of the problem of scope by allowing the
required entitlements to go beyond the goods explicitly listed in
international laws. The coherence argument above specifies principles for
decision-making that help avoid the problem of principles of scope in
general; a commitment to normative coherence is itself a principle that helps
avoid this third problem.
Even if the claims in the last paragraph were not true, it is notable that
the international right to health faces the same problems. Indeed, it likely
faces them to an even larger extent since the goods required to fulfill an
expansive version of the right are potentially astronomically expensive. A
healthy environment will be expensive indeed, and the duty to provide it is
even more diffuse than the duty to provide health care. These problems,
then, are no worse for the right to health care than for the broader right to
health, suggesting that this objection would prove too much, undermining
the case for the right to health that clearly exists as a matter of positive
international human rights law.

B. The Nature of Rights Suggests There Cannot Be a
Right to Health Care
The same thing can be said of the second objection one can lodge
against the international right to health care, which states that discussing a
160
right to health care misunderstands the nature of rights. This is, in part, a
simple restatement and expansion of the argument from the nature of rights
above. In short, it says that a right to health care cannot be fulfilled by any
candidate duty-holder. Where all rights entail correlative duties, and duties
can only exist where they are at least conceivably possible to fulfill, it is
difficult to explain how a right to health care can be a right. Yet, again, the
duties under an international right to health care are more easily discernible
and achievable than a right to health. It is easier to provide insulin than a
healthy environment (and easier to measure insulin provision than it is to
measure provision of a healthy environment and each country’s contribution
161
thereto).
Moreover, even if we grant that an international right to health care
does not fit the traditional claim-right model of rights where rights must
have achievable correlative duties, one cannot ignore the fact that
international human rights law recognizes a variety of rights that do not fit
this model, including the aforementioned rights to health, a healthy
environment, and water. International human rights law may have a unique
structure for rights that does not fit the traditional model. Even if this

159.
WHO Model List of Essential Medicines, 20th List, supra note 91.
160.
Sreenivasan, supra note 11, at 240.
161.
Recall that Sreenivasan lodges his argument from the nature of rights against the
broader right to health. Id.
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undermines the moral case for such rights (and I think there is reason to
162
think not all rights must fit that model), it does not undermine the case for
a right to health care as a matter of positive international human rights law.

C. The International Right to Health Care
Does Not Appear to Be a Single Right
This relates to the third possible objection I will address here—namely,
that the right articulated in international human rights law appears to be a
catchall term for a variety of claims that is not easily discernible as a right to
a particular thing, rather than a standalone right. As noted above, the
international human right to health care seems to require provision of
essential goods, fairness in health care allocation decisions concerning other
163
goods, and a functioning health care system. These purported entitlements
are related, but they are not identical. Once one acknowledges that not all
rights fit the traditional model, however, the complex nature of the right to
health care is no longer problematic. Indeed, many rights seem to fit this
complex form. Again, recall my discussion of the right to water to see how
even the structural component of the international right to health care is not
unique. If we think this is morally problematic, we can again appeal to
international human rights law’s general structure and note that positive
international human rights law happily acknowledges other non-standard
rights as a matter of positive law. Indeed, international human rights law’s
claim that all international human rights are indivisible actually supports the
idea that no international human right is going to have uniquely discernible
content and duties. If all rights entail all other rights, each right is going to
require the provision of more than just the goods clearly specified in the
articulation of each. Each will thus become complex in nature when we
fully specify its content. This may leave philosophers unhappy, but it is an
entailment of positive international human rights law, and my argument
here is limited to the case for a right to health care in positive international
human rights law.

D. The Link between Dignity and Health Care Requires More Evidence
A fourth objection states that the coherence argument makes the
international right to health care remain purely instrumental in nature.
Having conceded that health care provision may only weakly correlate with
improved health, and a right to health care that is purely instrumental to

162.
See Da Silva, Realizing the Right to Health Care in Canada, supra note 1, ch. 2. A
more sustained discussion of this point is the topic of another manuscript on which I am
presently working.
163.
I make the general case for an alternative structure for rights to health care in Da
Silva, A Goal-Oriented Understanding, supra note 99 .at 385 and in Da Silva, Realizing the
Right to Health Care in Canada, supra note 1, ch. 2 and 3. The work-in-progress in id.
addresses whether this structure can be generalized.
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improved health at a population level will be severely limited, I stated that it
is instrumental to achieving dignity without demonstrating the type of
strong correlation between access to health care and dignity that would
properly ground the right. One may further state that I failed to establish the
independent case for the intrinsic value of a right to health care. While I
provided standalone textual evidence for the existence of a right to health
care in the textual argument above, this objection has merit. It is true that
my case for health care as a necessary condition for a dignified life is nonscientific and is instead based on common sense and predictions about how
not being able to access medicines, vaccines, and other health care goods,
even outside the public health domain, could render one unable to access
their other rights. It is also true that this focus on dignity makes the right
primarily instrumental.
I do not think this is a problem with my account. One does not need to
rehearse social science evidence to make the instrumental case for health
care as a means of ensuring dignity, and an instrumental right can still be a
right as a matter of international human rights law, particularly where we
recognize that all rights are indivisible and will at times be realized as
instrumental to other rights. Moreover, this instrumental character of the
international right helps constrain the content of the right and avoid the
problem of scope. Finally, the procedural components of the right to health
care are not instrumental to equality but are non-instrumental aspects of
equality.

E. The Indivisibility of Human Rights Could Still Cut Against
My Account
The final objection I will address was highlighted above. The worry that
international human rights law fails to recognize a right to health care
lingers. The fact that all rights are connected could still easily cut against
my argument. An explicitly binding statement that there is a right to health
care is lacking in international human rights law. The lack of recognition of
an explicit right to health care could be evidence that it must be part of the
right to health. If the right to health is going to avoid redundancy, it must
provide some unique content to the indivisible mass of international human
rights. A right to health care is a clear candidate. After all, rights to most of
the other social determinants already exist elsewhere in the legal order. Yet
I must admit that there is a textual argument from absence and indivisibility
against recognition of an international right to health care. I simply maintain
that the other arguments given in favor of it outweigh this argument against
it.

Conclusion
While international human rights law does not explicitly recognize a
right to health care, the texts supporting the international right to health
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support recognition of such a right in a way that is not reducible to
recognizing such a right only when it is more instrumentally valuable for
improving health outcomes at the population level than alternatives. Health
care is also necessary for realizing other international rights. So, health care
provision is instrumentally necessary for recognition of these other goods.
This suggests that there is a health care component to other international
rights. International human rights law is thus most coherent where it
recognizes a right to health care. This coherence argument is further
strengthened by international trade law’s recognition of the primacy of
health care goods among other intellectual goods: international law as a
whole is most coherent when it recognizes health care as a good important
enough to ground a right. These arguments for recognition of a right to
health care deal with the most damaging critiques of the concept of an
international right to health care. Most lingering objections apply equally to
the international right to health. There is, then, good reason to acknowledge
the existence of an international right to health care as a matter of positive
law.

